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Ores and Scores:
Two Cases of How Competition Led to Productivity “Miracles”
M
BY SATYAJIT CHATTERJEE
The standard of living enjoyed by 
a nation’s residents derives from the 
productivity of those residents. Given 
the large differences in the standard of 
living across countries (and over time 
for many countries), macroeconomists 
have devoted a great deal of effort to 
understanding the determinants of 
labor productivity. In doing so, they 
have generally emphasized the positive 
role of the capital stock per worker (or 
acroeconomists have devoted a great deal 
of effort to understanding the determinants 
of labor productivity. They’ve generally 
emphasized variables such as capital stock per 
worker, technology, the quality of the workforce, and laws 
and regulations that govern production. Recent research 
has shown, however, that this conventional view may 
leave something out: the degree of competitive pressure 
faced by a production unit. In “Ores and Scores,” Satyajit 
Chatterjee examines two cases in which increased 
competition in the product market caused dramatic 
improvements in labor productivity: iron mines in the 
Midwest and public schools in Milwaukee.
the stock of material means of produc-
tion per worker), the sophistication of 
the technology embodied in that stock, 
the quality of a country’s workforce, 
and laws and regulations that govern 
production.
Recent research has shown that 
this conventional view of the determi-
nants of labor productivity may be in-
complete. Aside from the determinants 
listed above, the degree of competitive 
pressure faced by a production unit can 
also importantly influence the unit’s 
labor productivity. Specifically, this 
research has brought to light two ex-
amples of increased competition in the 
product market that caused dramatic 
improvements in labor productivity. 
The two cases concern ore production 
at midwestern iron mines and student 
achievement in the Milwaukee public 
schools — hence, the title of the 
article.1
The findings of this research 
are indeed noteworthy. As we are all 
aware, falling trade barriers, declining 
communication costs, and economic 
development elsewhere in the world 
are exposing increasing numbers of 
U.S. businesses to competition from 
low-cost rivals, both foreign and 
domestic. This increased competitive 
pressure was most intense during the 
years 2001 to 2003, when the U.S. 
manufacturing and high-technology 
sectors encountered a three-year slump 
in demand and the U.S. labor market 
did poorly in general. Remarkably, 
during these difficult years, output 
per hour in the U.S. nonfarm business 
sector rose at an average annual rate of 
3.8 percent per year — well above the 
2.2 percent rate recorded during the 
“boom” years of 1995 to 2000.2 One 
cannot help but wonder if there is a 
causal link between increasing com-
petitive pressure and the faster pace of 
productivity growth.
However, national (or macro-
level) labor productivity can grow for 
many reasons, not the least of which 
is the fact that during a downturn, 
average labor productivity of busi-
nesses could rise simply because the 
businesses that fail (and exit) tend to 
be the ones with below-average labor 
productivity. This Darwinian selec-
tion is a well-known channel through 
1 These cases have been described in the article 
by Jose Galdon-Sanchez and James Schmitz and 
the article by Caroline Hoxby.
2 The data on which this calculation is based 
are those available on the BLS web site 
(www.bls.gov) as of January 8, 2005.
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which competition affects national, or 
industry-level, productivity. 
But the noteworthy aspect of the 
two studies reviewed here is that each 
examined the impact of increased 
competition on labor productivity at 
the micro level, that is, at the level of 
production units that were in opera-
tion both before and after the change 
in competitive pressure. Thus, each 
study establishes the existence of a 
causal link running from increased 
competitive pressure to higher labor 
productivity that is distinct from the 
effect of Darwinian selection.
Furthermore, the studies shed 
new light on the determinants of labor 
productivity.  In principle, increased 
competitive pressure could increase 
labor productivity via changes in the 
conventionally recognized determi-
nants of labor productivity. In both 
cases, however, the increase in produc-
tivity was accomplished without any 
change in technology, worker quality, 
or regulation. Capital stock per worker 
(more generally, inputs per worker) did 
change, but the effect of this change 
was too small to plausibly account for 
the large change in labor productivity. 
In fact, the increase in productivity 
resulted from a change in how work 
was organized within the production 
unit. Thus, this research reveals that 
the organization of work, or work rules, 
is an important determinant of labor 
productivity as well. More crucially, 
the research shows that work rules re-
spond to competition: When competi-
tive pressure is high, production units 
choose work rules that enhance labor 
productivity.
The fact that more productive 
work rules are adopted under pressure 
suggests that workers might view such 
rules with disfavor. After reviewing the 
two studies, I will discuss some reasons 
why workers might resist more produc-
tive work practices. One reason could 
be job security if workers fear that jobs 
would be lost with the adoption of 
more productive work rules. This pos-
sibility probably explains why midwest-
ern mines did not adopt more produc-
tive work rules prior to the steel crises. 
Another reason could be the higher 
work intensity – and the attendant 
costs of stress and fatigue — associated 
with more productive work rules. This 
possibility probably explains why work 
practices in poorly performing Milwau-
kee public schools changed only after 
the voucher program was instituted.
This discussion is useful also 
because it identifies the types of 
industries (or occupations) in which 
resistance to productive work prac-
tices can be effective and for which, 
therefore, an increase in competitive 
pressure might be expected to raise 
labor productivity significantly.3 I 
use this identification to suggest that 
the ongoing (indeed, accelerating) 
diffusion of cutting-edge technologies 
outside of the industrialized world may 
be wearing down workers’ resistance 
to more productive work practices in 
many occupations and sectors of the 
U.S. economy. Indeed, recent pro-
ductivity and compensation trends in 
the U.S. may be starting to show the 
footprints of the competitive-pressure 
effect documented so clearly by the 
studies reviewed here.
A PRIMER ON LABOR
PRODUCTIVITY
For a business enterprise, labor 
productivity is the ratio of the value-
added by the production unit over a 
given period of time — say, a year 
— to the total number of full-time 
equivalent workers employed by the 
production unit over that same period.4 
The value-added by a production unit 
is simply the total value of goods and 
services produced by the production 
unit over a given period less the value 
of all goods and services purchased by 
the production unit from other firms 
and used up in production in that pe-
riod. It’s a measure of the value of work 
done by the production unit over the 
given period. The number of full-time 
equivalent workers is simply the total 
of all full-time workers employed by 
the production unit over the same pe-
riod of time plus the full-time equiva-
lent of all part-time workers.5 Thus, 
the labor productivity of a business 
3 Unfortunately, micro-level studies of labor 
productivity that exploit differences in the 
degree of competitive pressure (on production 
units) resulting from an outside event 
are relatively rare. Consequently, it is not 
possible to directly measure the scope of the 
competitive pressure effect seen in the case of 
the midwestern iron mines and the Milwaukee 
public schools. One other micro-level study 
that also documents the positive effect of 
competition on labor productivity is by Harry 
Bloch and James  McDonald for a group of  
Australian firms.
This research reveals that the organization 
of work, or work rules, is an important 
determinant of labor productivity.
4 An example of material used up in production 
is the iron ore used in the production of steel. 
When we calculate value-added by a steel 
company over a month, the cost of the iron 
ore used up during the month is subtracted 
from the dollar value of the steel produced that 
month. The cost of other inputs purchased from 
firms and used up in production is similarly 
subtracted from the dollar value of production.
5 For instance, a firm that has 50 full-time 
employees working 40 hours per week and 
six part-time employees working 20 hours per 
week will have a total of 53 full-time equivalent 
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enterprise is a measure of the average 
value contributed by workers over a 
given period.6
For the purposes of this article, 
it is important to know the kinds of 
things that can affect labor productiv-
ity. In this regard, the most important 
point to grasp is that labor productiv-
ity is a flow measure; that is, it has a 
unit of time associated with it (such as 
a year). Therefore, one way in which 
labor productivity can vary is simply 
through the volume of work a worker 
can perform in a given amount of time. 
A production unit in which workers 
can handle a greater volume of work 
in a given amount of time will have 
higher labor productivity.
The volume of work a worker 
can perform depends, in turn, on 
several factors. A very important one 
is the technology and capital stock a 
worker has access to in the production 
unit. For instance, a large and highly 
automated manufacturing plant makes 
it possible for workers to handle a very 
high volume of work. Similarly, office 
workers are able to handle a higher 
volume of work if they are aided in 
their tasks by computers and software. 
Thus, the capital stock per worker is 
an important determinant of labor 
productivity. 
In addition, there are intangible 
(but no less important) factors. Work-
ers with high cognitive ability and 
longer work experience accomplish 
more in a given period, and labor 
productivity will be higher in a produc-
tion unit with better educated and 
more experienced workers. Also, every 
production unit operates under a legal 
and regulatory framework specific to 
its location of operation. For instance, 
a manufacturing plant must abide by 
national or state pollution control laws 
that might constrain how much output 
it can produce in any given period. 
Thus, laws and regulations are also 
another determinant of labor produc-
tivity.
Broadly speaking, these four fac-
tors (the capital stock per worker, the 
level of technology, worker quality, and 
laws and regulations) have garnered 
the most attention from economists 
seeking to understand the determi-
nants of labor productivity. Now let’s 
turn to the evidence that suggests that 
the degree of competition can also 
influence productivity through the 
choice of work rules.
COMPETITIVE PRESSURE 
AND THE PRODUCTIVITY OF 
IRON ORE PRODUCERS 
The U.S. iron ore industry is lo-
cated in the Midwest. Because iron 
ore is heavy and costly to transport, 
U.S. ore producers supply ore only 
to U.S. steel producers located in 
the Great Lakes region. Between 
1979 and 1982, the U.S. economy 
experienced two recessions, almost 
back-to-back.7 This was also a period 
of depressed economic conditions 
in most of the industrialized world. 
As a result, world demand for steel fell 
sharply, and this decline hit the U.S. 
steel industry hard. The production 
of steel declined almost 50 percent 
between 1979 and 1982.
Since iron ore is used almost ex-
clusively as an input in the production 
of steel, the shrinkage in the demand 
for steel led to a corresponding decline 
in the demand for iron ore. Indeed, 
the demand for iron ore fell about 50 
percent as well. Furthermore, the de-
cline in the world market for steel led 
to a scramble by ore producers all over 
the world to find new customers. In 
the process, despite the huge distances 
involved, Brazilian mines began ship-
ping iron ore to steel producers in the 
Chicago area. Thus, both the shrink-
age in the demand for iron ore and 
the appearance of a competitor led to 
increased competitive pressure on U.S. 
iron ore producers.8
 The increase in competitive 
pressure coincided with a remarkable 
6 Labor productivity can also be measured as 
output generated per hour of work. Indeed, a 
commonly used statistic on labor productivity 
in the U.S. (available from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics) is output per hour of work in the 
nonfarm business sector. 
7 In terms of the unemployment rate and loss of 
GDP, the recession in 1982 was the worst U.S. 
recession since World War II.
8 Galdon-Sanchez and Schmitz define increased 
competitive pressure as an increased likelihood 
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change in the labor productivity of 
iron ore mines. As José Galdon-San-
chez and James Schmitz document, 
between 1965 and 1978, there was 
essentially no change in the labor 
productivity of U.S. iron ore producers. 
After 1982, labor productivity began to 
increase rapidly, and by the late 1980s, 
the productivity of U.S. iron ore pro-
ducers had doubled.9 But coincidence 
does not imply causality. Perhaps labor 
productivity would have risen even 
without the increase in competitive 
pressure. To be sure that the increase 
in labor productivity resulted from 
increased competitive pressure, Gal-
don-Sanchez and Schmitz compared 
how the collapse of the world steel 
market affected ore producers in other 
countries. This comparison is infor-
mative because the collapse affected 
ore producers differently in different 
countries.
Excluding the United States 
(which was the third largest producer 
of ore in 1980 among non-Commu-
nist countries), iron ore is produced 
in significant quantities in seven 
other countries. In order of volume of 
production in 1980, these countries 
are Brazil, Australia, Canada, India, 
France, Sweden, and South Africa. 
Based on the average cost of ore 
production in each country and the 
location of a country’s mines rela-
tive to its centers of steel production, 
Galdon-Sanchez and Schmitz sorted 
countries according to the degree of 
competitive pressure experienced as a 
result of the steel collapse. According 
to the authors’ calculations, mines in 
Australia, Brazil, and India faced the 
smallest increase in competitive pres-
sure, while mines in the U.S., Canada, 
France, South Africa, and Sweden 
faced the highest increase.10 When 
Galdon-Sanchez and Schmitz looked 
at how labor productivity evolved in 
each of these countries, they found 
that countries that faced the small-
est increase in competitive pressure 
— namely, Australia, Brazil, and India 
— experienced the smallest increases 
in labor productivity after the steel 
collapse. All of the other countries 
experienced much higher increases in 
labor productivity.11
Galdon-Sanchez and Schmitz 
present persuasive evidence that 
the increase in the labor productiv-
ity of U.S. mines was a consequence 
of increased competitive pressure. 
The next important question is how 
this increase was achieved. Remark-
ably, Galdon-Sanchez and Schmitz 
argue that the increase in the labor 
productivity of U.S. mines cannot be 
accounted for by changes in traditional 
determinants of labor productivity.12 
There were no improvements in 
technology or worker quality and no 
changes in regulations governing ore 
production. Capital stock per worker 
did rise, but the rise was not large 
enough to account for any significant 
proportion of the remarkable increase 
in labor productivity. 
Galdon-Sanchez and Schmitz also 
investigated if mines were shifting into 
the production of higher quality ore 
(which would presumably fetch more 
in the marketplace, thus boosting 
value-added and labor productivity), 
but they found no evidence of such a 
shift. They also determined that labor 
productivity did not go up because ore 
producers were shutting down low-pro-
ductivity mines.13 In their words, the 
increase in labor productivity occurred 
in “continuing mines, producing the 
same products and using the same 
technology as they had before the 
1980s.” 
This, of course, raises the question 
as to what exactly happened in these 
mines. In a recent article, Schmitz 
investigated this issue in detail. It 
turns out that the increase in labor 
productivity resulted mostly from 
changes in work rules. In most cases, 
these changes involved an expan-
9 It’s worth pointing out that there was no such 
dramatic shift in productivity growth at the 
national level. Output per hour in the nonfarm 
business sector rose at an annual rate of 2.2 
percent between 1965 and 1978 and at an 
annual rate of 1.97 percent between 1983 and 
1990.
After 1982, labor productivity began to 
increase rapidly, and by the late 1980s, the 
productivity of U.S. iron ore producers had 
doubled. But coincidence does not imply 
causality.
 
10 These calculations are based on cost, 
including freight of ores from various countries. 
For instance, mines whose basic cost of ore 
production is relatively low and whose distance 
from the closest center of steel production 
is small will face the smallest increase in 
competitive pressure. These mines will, in 
effect, be the mines of choice for some steel 
producers. Thus, shrinkage in the world 
demand for steel will affect low-cost, close-in 
producers the least while affecting the high-
cost, far-out mines the most.
11 The only exception to this pattern is France, 
where labor productivity declined steeply during 
the 1990s. Iron ore production is nonexistent in 
France at present.
12 This point is made in more depth in the 
recent article by Schmitz.
13 If an ore producer shuts down mines with 
low labor productivity, the producer’s labor 
productivity will rise simply because there are 
fewer low-productivity mines pulling down the 
average labor productivity of the ore producer.10   Q1 2005 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org   Business Review  Q1 2005  11 www.philadelphiafed.org
sion in the set of tasks a worker was 
required to perform. For example, the 
changes required equipment handlers 
to perform routine maintenance on 
their equipment. Before, this mainte-
nance was the responsibility of repair-
men. In addition, the new work rules 
insisted on a flexible assignment of 
work; that is, a worker was required to 
occasionally do tasks assigned primar-
ily to another worker. In both cases, 
the new work rules led to better use of 
a worker’s time.
To summarize, the evolution of 
the labor productivity of U.S. iron ore 
mines during the 1980s shows that 
labor productivity depends on more 
than just the stock of material means 
of production, worker quality, and 
regulations. It also depends on the 
work rules in place. Furthermore, work 
rules appear to be a choice variable. 
When competitive pressure is high, 
the production units choose work rules 




Let’s turn now to another example 
of increased competitive pressure 
leading to higher productivity: public 
schools in Milwaukee. Since schools 
don’t sell their “output” in the market-
place, the notion of labor productivity 
defined earlier is not directly appli-
cable.  In this context, we can take 
productivity to mean what taxpayers 
get for their money: average student 
achievement of a school divided by per 
pupil school expenditures.15
The Milwaukee school district 
introduced school vouchers for poor 
students in the 1991-1992 school year. 
With a voucher, an eligible student 
could go to a private school and have 
about $5000 of tuition costs reim-
bursed. The public school district 
that lost the student would lose about 
29 percent of its per pupil revenue. 
Although many students were eligible 
for vouchers, the number of vouchers 
given was capped at 1 percent of public 
school enrollment. After a long legal 
dispute, however, this cap was raised 
to 15 percent, starting with the 1998-
1999 school year.16
As in the iron ore case, it’s pos-
sible to classify Milwaukee public 
schools according to the degree of 
competitive pressure faced as a result 
of the voucher program. This classifi-
cation is based on the fraction of stu-
dents eligible for vouchers in a school 
district. Because eligibility depends on 
household income, this fraction varies 
widely. Some school districts had more 
than 90 percent of students eligible for 
vouchers and others as few as 25 per-
cent. Caroline Hoxby classified school 
districts with at least 67 percent of 
students eligible for vouchers as being 
under the most competitive pressure, 
while those with less than 67 percent 
as being under moderate competitive 
pressure.
Hoxby compared school produc-
tivity (the percentile score of a school’s 
fourth-grade class in different subjects 
per $1000 of per pupil spending) for 
1996-1997 (the last year before the 
cap was raised to 15 percent) with 
school productivity in 1999-2000. She 
finds that school productivity rose 46 
percent and 56 percent for math and 
science and 23 percent and 11 percent 
for social studies and language in the 
schools under the most competitive 
pressure. In contrast, schools under 
moderate competitive pressure showed 
increases of 10 percent, 45 percent, 10 
percent, and 4 percent, respectively.
To be confident that the increase 
in school productivity was the result of 
increased competitive pressure,
Hoxby compared the performance 
of Milwaukee schools with that of 
other Wisconsin schools that were not 
part of the voucher program. For this 
comparison, she selected Wisconsin 
schools outside of Milwaukee that re-
sembled Milwaukee schools as much as 
possible. For this comparison group she 
found increases in school productivity 
— in math, science, social studies, and 
language — of 18 percent, 9 percent, 
and 4 percent, and a decline of 10 per-
cent, respectively, between 1996-1997 
and 1999-2000. 
Thus, for every subject, the rank-
ing by percentage increase in school 
productivity was identical. Schools 
under the most competitive pressure 
showed the greatest increase, schools 
under moderate competitive pressure 
showed the second largest increase, 
and schools under no competitive pres-
14 The reasons competitive pressure and labor 
productivity are linked are discussed later on in 
the article.
15 See Caroline Hoxby’s article for a more 
detailed discussion of this measure and 
Theodore Crone’s article for a discussion 
of student scores as a measure of school 
achievement.
16 Hoxby studies the impact of this reform 
in detail because it satisfies three critical 
requirements: “(1) there is a realistic possibility 
that at least 5 percent of regular public school 
enrollment could go to choice schools, (2) the 
regular public schools lose at least some money 
when a student goes to a choice school, and (3) 
the reform has been in place for a few years.” 
Clearly, (1) and (2) are necessary conditions for 
a reform to generate competitive pressure on a 
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sure showed the smallest increase.17 
What factors contributed to this 
increase in productivity? In her discus-
sion, Hoxby notes some of the ways 
a school superintendent could raise 
the performance of his or her school. 
These include re-allocation of teacher 
effort toward basic skill-building classes 
such as reading and math and reward-
ing teachers whose students showed 
improvement in scores while letting 
unproductive staff go (i.e., moving to 
more performance-based compensa-
tion). Thus, it would appear that these 
increases in productivity were also the 
result of changes in work rules.18
WHY DOES COMPETITION 
AFFECT THE CHOICE OF 
WORK RULES?
The main lessons to be drawn 
from these two studies are that work 
rules are an important determinant of 
labor productivity and that work rules 
respond to competition. Why might 
this be so? Although the connection 
between competition and productivity 
may seem obvious, there is something 
to be gained from thinking carefully 
about it.
Thinking generally about the fact 
that more productive work rules are 
adopted under pressure suggests one of 
two things. First, it may be that more 
productive work rules are invented 
only when the need for such rules 
becomes acute. In other words, neces-
sity may be the mother of invention in 
the case of work rules (as in so much 
else). Alternatively, the knowledge of 
more productive work rules may exist, 
but such rules are adopted only under 
pressure because workers view such 
rules with disfavor. In what follows, I 
will leave aside the issue of organiza-
tional innovation and consider only 
the second alternative in more detail. 
Therefore, I will focus on the case of 
relatively simple changes in work rules 
that raise labor productivity.
Why might workers view more 
productive work rules with disfavor? 
One possibility is that workers experi-
ence increased job insecurity as a 
result of such rules; that is, workers 
associate more productive work rules 
with a higher likelihood of job loss.19 
Certainly, more productive work rules 
mean that any given level of output 
can be produced with fewer work-
ers. With no change in a firm’s sales, 
adopting more productive work rules 
will result in some workers being laid 
off. Workers as a group may then resist 
adopting the rules until a crisis threat-
ens business failure and the loss of all 
jobs. Then, the more productive work 
rules will be adopted because doing so 
saves some jobs that would otherwise 
be lost.
But one must ask under what 
circumstances workers can actually 
resist more productive work rules. 
Three conditions must be satisfied. 
First, if owners (or their representa-
tives, the managers) can unilaterally 
dictate work practices, they can insist 
that more productive work rules be 
adopted. Because such rules increase 
profits — at a minimum, the firm 
can produce the same output with 
fewer workers and hence at lower cost 
— owners obviously have an incen-
tive to do so. Thus, for there to be any 
resistance at all, the right to dictate 
work practices must reside partially 
with workers.
Second, a new firm does not have 
to face established employees worried 
about job security and can therefore 
adopt the more productive work rules. 
If workers in established firms do not 
have the right to dictate work rules in 
new firms, and if the threat of compe-
tition from new entrants is sufficiently 
real, workers in established firms will 
feel compelled to adopt more produc-
tive work rules as soon as these rules 
become known.20 Thus, the threat of 
a new entrant with more productive 
work rules must be low or nonexistent.
Finally, it must be in workers’ 
interest to resist more productive work 
rules. That depends on whether the 
firm can sell the additional output 
— delivered by an unchanged number 
17 Hoxby’s findings have attracted a lot of 
attention. In a somewhat related study, Cecilia 
Rouse found that Milwaukee students who 
took advantage of the voucher program and 
transferred to private/parochial schools did 
only somewhat better in math and not at 
all in reading. Although students who left 
Milwaukee public schools are not Hoxby’s focus, 
Rouse’s findings have led some to question 
the usefulness of school choice as a way of 
raising student achievement. In a more recent 
study, Rajashri Chakrabarti has analyzed the 
impact of the Florida voucher program and 
re-affirmed the importance of voucher programs 
in providing incentives to improve school 
productivity. 
18 However, the nature of the voucher program 
complicates this inference for the following rea-
son. When a student uses the voucher program, 
the school that loses the student loses only 29 
percent of per pupil revenue. Consequently, 
schools that lose students to the voucher pro-
gram see an increase in the resources available 
per (remaining) pupil (provided, of course, the 
overall school budget does not change for some 
other reason). Increase in per pupil spending is 
akin to an increase in inputs, and that could be 
a factor in the improved performance of schools. 
Schools under the most competitive pressure 
did see an increase in average spending per pu-
pil. This increase was about 6 percent. Over the 
same period, the comparison schools outside of 
Milwaukee saw an increase of 2 percent in per 
pupil spending. This suggests that spending per 
pupil in the schools under the most competi-
tive pressure probably rose about 4 percent as 
a result of the voucher program. Of course, the 
price of education inputs probably rose over this 
period as well, so that the actual real increase in 
spending per pupil was less than 4 percent. Un-
less an increase of 4 percent or less in spending 
per pupil had a huge effect on school productiv-
ity, most of the increase in school productivity 
probably resulted from changes unrelated to the 
quantity of inputs.
19 This discussion draws heavily on the 2004 
paper by James Schmitz and on the book by 
Stephen Parente and Edward Prescott.  Parente 
and Prescott discuss barriers to the adoption of 
new technology (as opposed to work rules), but 
much of what they say is relevant for the choice 
of work rules as well.
20 Entry by a more efficient competitor is like a 
crisis: It threatens business failure and the loss 
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of workers using more productive work 
rules — without precipitating a large 
drop in price. If the firm is a small 
player in a big market, the increased 
production may cause little or no drop 
in price. In this case, the firm’s rev-
enue will go up without any increase 
in costs. By passing on some of the 
additional revenue to workers, the firm 
can induce workers to accept the more 
productive work rule. Thus, for job 
security to be an issue, the firm must 
be large relative to the market it serves.
These three conditions — the 
worker’s right to partially dictate work 
rules, barriers to entry by new firms, 
and large firm-size relative to market 
— are features of monopolistic indus-
tries.21 Thus, workers in monopolistic 
industries may have the ability and 
the incentive to resist productive work 
rules for job security reasons. The min-
ing example certainly fits this pattern. 
Work practices in the midwestern 
mines were partially under the control 
of labor unions, so managers could not 
unilaterally dictate work practices. The 
high cost of shipping iron ore over long 
distances kept the threat of entry by 
new firms low. Finally, the midwestern 
mines were big relative to their market 
— there being only a handful of mines 
serving the Great Lakes steel produc-
ers. Thus, loss of job security could 
explain why miners resisted more pro-
ductive work rules until the steel crisis 
broke that resistance down. Indeed, 
when these rules were adopted, the 
mines eliminated a significant number 
of jobs.
But loss of job security cannot 
be the reason some Milwaukee public 
schools had poor student achieve-
ment prior to the voucher program. 
Better student scores would have led 
to teachers being lauded rather than 
being laid off! To understand this 
example, we must consider the pos-
sibility that workers may view more 
productive work rules with disfavor 
because such rules demand more effort 
and therefore feel more onerous. This 
possibility seems natural if we recall 
that labor productivity is determined 
by the volume of work handled by a 
worker. Since a higher volume of work 
— with no change in technology or 
capital stock per worker — is likely 
to be associated with a higher level of 
work intensity, work rules that promote 
higher labor productivity may well feel 
more onerous to workers.
But, again, we must ask under 
what circumstances would workers 
have the ability to resist more onerous 
but more productive work rules and 
whether they would have an incentive 
to do so. Let’s assume that workers 
have the right to at least partially 
dictate work practices and that the 
threat of entry by new firms with more 
productive work rules is low or nonex-
istent. Then workers would certainly 
be able to resist changes in work rules. 
Further, let’s assume that workers do 
not fear the possibility of job loss from 
adopting the work rule — the firm is a 
small player in a big market.
Because work rules are oner-
ous, workers would want additional 
compensation to offset the costs as-
sociated with adopting the rule. If the 
maximum additional compensation 
21 Strictly speaking, a fourth condition must also 
be met. One must ask why a firm with too many 
workers doesn’t buy its excess workers out – 
paying for the buyout from future reductions in 
operating costs. Schmitz observes that a firm’s 
ability to finance the buyout will depend on its 
borrowing capacity. But because a firm has the 
option to default on its debt, the amount it can 
credibly borrow may not be sufficient to cover 
the cost of a full buyout.  Consequently, it may 
not be possible to buy out all excess workers.
that owners can pay is less than the 
minimum workers will accept, the rule 
would not be adopted. The additional 
compensation demanded by workers 
will depend importantly on what hap-
pens if the rule is not adopted. If the 
refusal to adopt results in both workers’ 
and owners’ carrying on as before, 
there will be less urgency on the part 
of workers to adopt the rule. In such 
circumstances, workers will be aggres-
sive in their demand for additional 
compensation, and the rule may not be 
adopted. On the other hand, if the re-
fusal to adopt results in an impairment 
of the firm’s ability to compete and 
thereby raises the likelihood of layoffs 
or business failure, workers would be 
less aggressive in their demand, and 
the rule is more likely to be adopted.22
This logic can make sense of the 
voucher program’s effect on Milwaukee 
public schools. Since teachers unions 
partially dictate work practices, one 
of the preconditions for resistance to 
changes in work rules is certainly met. 
By its nature, entry into the “market 
for public schools” is restricted, so the 
22  For readers familiar with the theory of 
bargaining, I should point out that (Nash) 
bargaining will lead to an efficient outcome. 
That is, all work rule changes that are 
sufficiently productive would be adopted, and 
workers would be adequately compensated 
for putting up with the rules. But the 
requirement of efficiency does not pin down the 
compensation work rule package because there 
are many efficient packages. Which efficient 
package is picked will depend on the outside 
options of workers and owners. When workers’ 
outside options deteriorate, the bargaining will 
move the compensation work rule package in 
the direction that makes workers worse off and 
owners better off; that is, compensation will fall 
and work rules will become more onerous.
Workers in monopolistic industries may have 
the ability and the incentive to resist productive 
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23 Withdrawal of a sufficiently large number of 
students would result in the loss of teaching 
positions and, therefore, in the loss of jobs for 
some teachers.
second pre-condition is also met. Be-
fore the voucher program was set up, 
the incentive to adopt work practices 
that improved school performance was 
weak because failure to adopt meant 
the status quo. But by giving a signifi-
cant fraction of students the option 
to withdraw from poorly performing 
schools, the voucher program linked 
a school’s nonperformance to loss of 
resources and, possibly, jobs.23 Since 
improvement in school performance 
would presumably obviate the need for 
parents to switch schools, there was 
now a stronger incentive to adopt work 
rules that enhanced school perfor-
mance.
IMPLICATIONS FOR RECENT 
PRODUCTIVITY AND
COMPENSATION TRENDS
So far the discussion has empha-
sized workers’ right to partially dictate 
work practices and the low threat of 
entry by new firms as two important 
pre-conditions for workers to success-
fully resist more productive work rules 
when they have an incentive to do so. 
But the workers’ “right” to dictate work 
practices and barriers to entry by new 
firms are, to some degree, features of 
every U.S. industry. Although the bulk 
of the U.S. workforce is not unionized, 
workers exert considerable influence 
on the choice of work rules because a 
business can ignore worker preferences 
concerning work practices only at the 
cost of (excessive) employee turnover. 
Similarly, while most U.S. industry is 
generally open to competition, estab-
lished firms in any industry wield con-
siderable advantage over new entrants, 
an advantage that constrains how well 
new entrants can compete with estab-
lished firms. Thus, the choice of work 
rules will be influenced by the “bar-
gaining strength” of workers to some 
degree in every industry. When that 
bargaining strength is weakened, there 
will be a tendency for more productive 
work rules to be adopted.
 Competitive pressure and the 
choice of work rules may be relevant 
in understanding recent productivity 
and compensation trends in the U.S. 
As noted earlier, the U.S. economy has 
experienced significantly faster growth 
in labor productivity since 1995. Inter-
estingly, between 1995 and 2000, the 
growth rate of output per hour in the 
nonfarm business sector was roughly 
matched by the growth rate of hourly 
compensation, adjusted for inflation, 
in this sector.24 Economic theory pre-
dicts that productivity growth that is 
due to the diffusion of new technology 
should result in a comparable increase 
in the growth rate of compensation 
per hour. Since this is what happened, 
neither the pickup in productivity 
growth nor the pickup in compensa-
tion per hour is mysterious. Both are 
generally attributed to the diffusion of 
new technologies.
Since 2001, however, the situation 
has been quite different. The growth 
rate of worker compensation per hour 
has not kept pace with the growth rate 
of labor productivity.25 Why has this 
happened? One possibility is that the 
recession, by raising the likelihood of 
business failure, weakened workers’ 
resistance to more productive work 
practices. This would explain why pro-
ductivity has risen without a compa-
rable increase in labor compensation. 
But a more important force working 
in the same direction is the ongoing 
diffusion of modern technology to 
countries outside the developed world. 
This diffusion is gradually increasing 
the threat of entry by new low-cost 
producers in many lines of business, a 
trend that has become particularly no-
ticeable since the late 1990s. Perhaps 
this development is also contributing 
to a weakening of worker resistance to 
more productive work practices.
It’s worth noting that regardless 
of the reasons for worker resistance 
to more productive work practices, 
some workers are made worse off by 
the adoption of such rules. Thus, the 
benefits stemming from improved labor 
productivity must be set against the 
loss experienced by some workers. It’s 
natural, then, to wonder whether this 
offset completely swamps the benefits. 
Historically, improvements in labor 
productivity have served as the foun-
dation for a general improvement in 
the standard of living, even when the 
improvements initially affected some 
portion of the population adversely. 
There is no reason yet to think that 
the same will not be true of the ongo-
ing improvements in labor productiv-
ity.
By giving a significant 
fraction of students
the option to 
withdraw from poorly 
performing schools, 
the voucher program 
linked a school’s 
nonperformance to 
loss of resources and, 
possibly, jobs.
24 Output per hour grew at an annual rate of 2.2 
percent, while hourly compensation grew at an 
annual rate of 2.0 percent.
25 Over these three years, output per hour in the 
nonfarm business sector rose at an annual rate 
of 3.8 percent, while hourly compensation rose 
at an annual rate of only 1.5 percent.14   Q1 2005 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org   Business Review  Q1 2005   15 www.philadelphiafed.org
CONCLUSION
The concept of labor productivity 
is an important one in macroeconom-
ics. Economists who study the deter-
minants of labor productivity generally 
focus on the positive role of the capital 
stock (the material means of produc-
tion), the level of technology embed-
ded in that stock, worker education, 
and laws and regulations. Two recent 
research studies suggest that this list 
ought to be amended to include the 
choice of work rules as well. These 
two studies — one dealing with the 
productivity of iron ore mines and 
the other with that of public schools 
— clearly demonstrated that an in-
crease in competitive pressure can lead 
to adoption of work rules that enhance 
labor productivity.
The studies used a very similar 
methodology to make their case. The 
first step was to identify an event that 
led to increased competitive pressure 
on production units. In the case of 
the midwestern iron mines, it was the 
collapse of steel production in the early 
1980s; in the case of the Milwaukee 
public schools, it was the introduction 
of a voucher program. The next step 
was to sort production units (mines 
and public schools) by the degree of in-
creased competitive pressure faced as a 
result of that event. Then, in the final 
step, the change in pre- and post-event 
labor productivity of the production 
units that faced the most increase in 
competitive pressure was compared 
with the change in pre- and post-event 
productivity of units that faced the 
least increase in competitive pressure. 
Both studies found that labor pro-
ductivity grew most in the units that 
faced the most increase in competitive 
pressure.
If adopting more productive work 
rules had no adverse consequences for 
workers, it would be hard to under-
stand why a more productive work 
rule would not be adopted as soon as 
workers or owners think of it. The fact 
that such rules are adopted under pres-
sure suggests that workers lose some-
thing from adopting such rules. More 
productive work rules may result in loss 
of jobs, and workers, understandably, 
resist such rules. Alternatively, more 
productive work rules may require 
workers to handle a greater volume of 
work, a situation that may make such 
rules seem onerous. These reasons 
could explain why productive work 
rules are not adopted until increased 
competitive pressure forces workers to 
relent.
Competitive pressure on a busi-
ness goes up when it experiences a 
decline in demand for its product. 
Such declines can happen during a 
downturn or when the firm encounters 
new low-cost rivals vying for custom-
ers. Since 2000, we have seen both. 
There was a recession and increased 
competition from firms in the develop-
ing world. Arguably, these develop-
ments may account for why the pace of 
productivity growth has risen and why 
the pace of labor compensation growth 
has slowed since 2000. For this reason, 
the evidence on the role of competitive 
pressure in labor productivity reviewed 
in this article is noteworthy and 
relevant. B R
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